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Health care reform in the 103 r" and 104^ Congresses
has run the gambit from extremely ambitious to less than
ambitious undertakings. Proposals have engendered partisan
debates, because of the scope and complexity of the issues
involved and their implications for the federal deficit.
Estimating the budget consequences of health care reform has
become critical because of the strong link between health
care programs and the growth in the deficit. This thesis
examines the major health care reform proposals considered
by Congress during the period 1993-1996. These included the
comprehensive bills considered in response to President
Clinton's proposed overhaul in 1993-94, the cuts included in
the Republican- led balanced budget plan in 1995 and the
Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill, which became law in 1996. In each
case, the thesis examined the deficit situation facing
Congress at the time health care reform was engaged, plans
to address the deficit, and the impact of each health care
reform on the federal deficit. Data was obtained from
congressional reports and periodicals, journals and
Congressional Budget Office documentation. The major
finding was that health care legislation which portends
minimal impact on beneficiaries, providers and the deficit
is much more likely to succeed, while legislation which has
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I . INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding health care and health care
reform in the U.S. is not new. It formally dates back to
the administrations of Roosevelt (1932-1945) and Truman
(1945-1952)
.
In 1974 health care reform headed the domestic
policy agenda of the United States. Then, much as today,
the central issues debated were: what is the government's
role in health care? Should the United States have a
national health insurance program? Who should be covered?
Should employers be required to provide health care plans
for their employees? Should taxes be raised to cover the
additional costs of providing health care? (Banks, 1994, p.
XV)
Today, 20 years latter, we find ourselves revisiting
these same issues. Health care again tops the legislative
agenda for the President and Congress, in large part because
of the continued rapid growth in national health care
expenditures, the public perception of the relationship
between the deficit and the cost of health care, and public
realization that inaction on the part of our elected
officials will result in the demise of the Medicare security
blanket for elderly citizens.
Until this century, few people lived into old age.
Fewer than one percent of the world's population was 65
years of age or older in 1900. Today, that number has grown
to six percent worldwide and 12 percent in the United
States. Estimates are that by the year 2050 nearly a
quarter of Americans will be 65 years of age or older.
(Mathews, 1996, p. 6B)
In 1992, health care spending absorbed 14 percent of
the gross domestic product (GDP), up from 5.9 percent in
1965. Without some sort of reform, health care spending is
expected to rise to 19 percent of GDP by the year 2000.
Almost one out of every five dollars spent by Americans will
go to health care, robbing workers of wages, straining state
and local budgets and adding billions of dollars to the
federal debt. (President's Report, 1993, p. 7) "The budget
projections indicate that Medicare outlays will rise from
$176 billion in 1995 (2.5 percent of GDP) to $344 billion
(3.5 percent of GDP) in 2002 and to $460 billion (4 percent
of GDP) in 2005." (Aaron, 1995, p. 2) The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) now projects the federal deficit will
climb to $244 billion, or 2 . 7 percent of GDP, by 2000.
However, if spending for the major health entitlements could
be held to its current share of GDP, the federal deficit
would be substantially less in 2000.
A. MAJOR FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS
Medicare and Medicaid are the major health care




Medicare was enacted as an amendment to the Social
Security Act in 1965. It was the result of several factors.
First, there was the growing concern that elderly citizens
were vulnerable to the high costs of catastrophic illnesses,
primarily due to the paucity of insurance and the greater
health needs of the elderly. In the early 1960s, before
Medicare, only about half of older Americans had any health
insurance, as compared to 75 percent of those below 65 years
of age. Some seeking insurance were denied on the basis of
age or pre-existing conditions, others simply could not
afford insurance. Second, the elderly were becoming a
powerful political influence, not for the size of the
elderly population, but as a result of the strong bipartisan
political support they enjoyed in all parts of the country.
(Banks, 1994, p. 5)
Medicare covers all Americans and permanent residents
65 years of age or older, persons with end-stage renal
disease (ESRD) , and those receiving Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI ) benefits for at least two years.
It is divided into two components: Hospital Insurance (Part
A) and Supplemental Medical Insurance (Part B)
.
Part A helps pay the cost of hospital inpatient and
skilled nursing care, and is considered an earned benefit
for most people, requiring no premium upon eligibility. It
is funded by current employees and their employers, each
paying 1.45 percent of the worker's salary (self employed
workers pay 2.9 percent) to the Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund. Part A benefits are considered to be earned, much as
those from a conventional insurance policy, by the payroll
tax deductions beneficiaries and their employers contributed
to these programs.
Part B is voluntary insurance for physician services
financed through monthly premiums ($46.10 in 1995), which
cover about 25 percent of costs, and federal tax revenues,
which cover the remaining 75 percent. In 1994, over 98
percent of elderly and 88 percent of disabled beneficiaries
elected to participate in Medicare Part B (National Academy
on Aging, 1995, p. 1) . Part B generally pays 80 percent of
the physician and outpatient services after the annual $100
deductible
.
Coverage includes physician services, laboratory
and other diagnostic tests; X-ray and other
radiation therapy; outpatient services at a
hospital, rehabilitation facility, or rural health
clinic; home dialysis supplies and equipment;
ambulance services; physical and speech therapy;
mammography screening and screening pap smears;
and outpatient mental health services (50 percent
of approved amount only) . (National Academy on
Aging, 1995, p. 2)
Neither component of Medicare covers beneficiaries for
prescription drugs, non-surgical dental services,
eyeglasses, hearing aids, or long term care (i.e., that care
provided by nursing facilities in the community or at home)
.
Medicare beneficiaries face cost-sharing in the form of
premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance, as well as the cost
of services and products not covered by Medicare. There is
no limit to the out-of-pocket expenses elderly Medicare
recipients can incur. Unlike most private insurance,
Medicare does not cap beneficiaries' out-of-pocket expenses.
"In 1994, older persons (excluding those living in nursing
homes) on average spent $2,519 on health care or 21 percent
of their average household income." (National Academy on
Aging, 1995, p. 2) However, due to the disparities between
the amounts paid and the formula for making payments, older
Americans in 1995 were receiving more than ten times as much
in Medicare benefits as they and their employers contributed
in taxes, including interest on those contributions.
(Peterson, 1994, p. 44)
2 . Medicaid
Medicaid is the chief provider of health care for the
more than 25 million poor adults and children. Unlike
Medicare, Medicaid is a joint federal-state means-tested
program available to various groups of low income Americans.
Means-tested programs are those in which a recipient's
income is taken into account when determining eligibility
for benefits. Women and children receiving benefits under
the state-federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program automatically qualify, as do low- income
blind, elderly and disabled people getting cash assistance
under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, and
low income children and pregnant women. States, under a
federal waiver, may cover additional persons who face
crushing medical costs but whose income or assets are too
great to allow them to qualify for SSI or AFDC. Thus the
total number of persons eligible for Medicaid benefits is
determined by each state.
Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal and state
governments. The federal government pays about 57 percent
of the Medicaid costs, while the states pay the remaining 43
percent, both out of general tax revenues. States
administer the program and set specific eligibility
requirements and benefits packages. Thus, unlike Medicare,
there is a wide ranging composition of benefits packages
depending on the population and wealth of the individual
state. States such as California and New York offer
comparatively generous benefits, while states such as
Mississippi and Arkansas have less generous packages.
(Banks, 1994, p. 7)
Most Medicaid spending goes to the elderly in the form
of long term nursing home care and rehabilitation, and the
non-elderly disabled. (Hager, 1993, p. 24)
B. FEDERAL SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE
Medicare and Medicaid are two of the fastest growing
federal programs. Medicaid's growth rate averaged 17.8
percent between 1988 and 1995 (Fraley, Jun 10, 1995, p.
1638), and grew 31.5 percent between 1991 and 1992. During
the same period, Medicare's growth rate averaged 10 percent,
and grew 13.9 percent between 1991 and 1992 - roughly four
times the rate of inflation and faster than any other
federal entitlement, except Medicaid. (Hager, Jan 2, 1993, p.
22)
By comparison, general health care costs grew about 11
percent, and the consumer price index grew 3.1 percent,
between 1991 and 1992. (Rovner, 1993, p. 28) In 1992,
federal, state and local governments paid nearly half the
nation's total $832 billion health bill. The federal
government footed slightly more than 31 percent of this $832
billion bill. Almost three-fourths of that is spent on
Medicare and Medicaid payments. (Rubin, 1993, p. 955)


































Figure 1. Rising Medicare and Medicaid Costs
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Aug 1996
Although there are diverse reasons for the growth in
health costs in general, and Medicare and Medicaid in
particular, most analysts agree that some key elements are
common to all three. The two biggest health care cost
drivers are technology and demographics. (Rovner, 1993, p.
28)
Technology boosts health costs because it provides
doctors and hospitals new procedures and tests they can
perform on patients, which are usually more expensive. The
rapid technological change in health care has certainly
improved the quality of service to patients. "However,
because third-party payments encourage overuse of new
technology, new technology has likely been overdeveloped,
beyond the point at which its marginal benefit equals its
marginal cost." (Hyman, 1996, p. 302) Additionally, the
retrospective payment system used by private insurance
providers reduced the incentives for the research and
development (R & D) sector to invest in developing medical
care techniques that were of both higher quality and cost
effective. (Weisbrod, 1991, pp. 527-529)
The effect of health care insurance on incentives
for R&D depends on the operational definition of
health care—that is, on the boundaries of the
insurance contract. Health insurance contracts do
not offer the option of coverage only for
particular subsets of technologies, such as those
available at a given point in time. The more
broadly health care is interpreted under the
contract, and the more responsive it is to changes
in technology, the broader the range of activities
over which insurance will encourage R&D. If
insurance coverage is defined, as it has been, to
encompass new technologies regardless of the costs
involved, and to encompass an ever widening
concept of health care that is, itself,
responsive to the development of new technologies,
the R&D sector will continue to face incentives
that reward costly new measures relative to cost-
reducing innovations. (Weisbrod, 1991, pp. 529-
530)
When new technology is developed and utilized beyond an
efficient level, then more than an efficient amount of
capital will be used by the health care industry. This is a
common phenomenon with hospitals competing on the basis of
the latest technology and comfort, rather than seeking to
economize on cost and keeping patient prices down. This
eagerness of doctors and hospitals to utilize and prescribe
the wonders of modern technology has contributed to the rise
of health care expenditures in the United States. (Hyman,
1996, p. 302) "A magnetic resonance imaging machine may or
may not provide better information than a plain old X-ray,
but it is indisputably more expensive." (Rovner, 1993, p.
28)
As America ages, its total health care bill rises,
because the elderly consume more health care services than
younger adults. This affects Medicare disproportionately
since most of its 38 million beneficiaries are over the age
of 65. However, it also affects Medicaid costs, because
Medicaid pays for the long term nursing home care. Indeed,
while the elderly represented only 12 percent of Medicaid's
nearly 37 million recipients in 1996, they consumed one-
third of all Medicaid spending, mostly for nursing home
care. (CBO, 1996, p. 435)
Figure 2 depicts the top twelve entitlement spending
programs of the federal government, ranked by size.
Entitlement programs now account for more than half of the
federal budget, and continue to grow. The sheer size and
growth of these programs necessitates their review when
looking for ways to control the deficit. Medicare and
Medicaid combine size with explosive growth rates to make
them the two most serious budget problems.




1. Social Security $267 6.2 5.8
2. Medicare $114 8.6 11.6
3. Deposit Insurance $66 NA NA
4. Medicaid $53 15.0 15.8
5. Federal Civilian Retirement $37 6.2 6.9
6. Unemployment $25 8.0 0.7
7. Military Retirement $23 6.6 5.7
8. Food Stamps $20 8.1 4.0
9. Supplemental Security Income $15 9.1 9.4
10. Family Support $14 7.8 5.3
1 1 . Veterans' Benefits $14 2.4 4.6
12. Farm Price Supports $10 -9.0 -1.4
Figure 2. Top Entitlements 1991 "From (Hager, 1993, p. 26)"
Source: Congressional Budget Office
Getting control of the federal deficit has become tied
directly to the extraordinarily difficult problem of
containing health care costs. In the words of Senator
George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) , former Senate Majority Leader,
"I do not believe that we can in any meaningful way address
the deficit unless and until we address health-care costs."
(Rovner, 1993, p. 28)
C. THE FEDERAL DEFICIT
"The budget deficit is the central problem of the
federal government and one from which many of the country's
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most difficult problems flow." (Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 1995, p. 24) Why have deficits become such
a problem for budget decision makers? Simply put, spending
has been growing faster than revenues . Revenues have
remained nearly constant as a percentage of GDP (about 19
percent) since the 1960s. However, outlays have grown from
less than 18 percent of GDP in 1965 up to 24 percent in 1983
before falling to 21 percent today. Much of this growth in
spending has come from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid
and interest payments on the debt (see Figure 3) . (OMB,
1996, p.l)
1965
N QN-DE FE N SE ISGHETIONARY:
1975 1985 1995
Figure 3. Outlays as a Percentage of GDP "From (OMB, 1996,
p. 2)"
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In the 1990s, Congress and the administration have made
noticeable strides in reducing the federal deficit, whether
the deficit is considered in absolute numbers or as a
percentage of GDP. 1996 was the fourth straight year in
which the deficit declined. According to the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) , the deficit declined from $254.7
billion and 4.1 percent of GDP in FY1993 to $107.3 billion
(the smallest since 1981) and 1.4 percent of GDP (the
smallest since 1974) in FY1996. However, both officials
from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and CBO
predict that beginning in FY 1997, the deficit will again
begin to rise. Administration officials predict the deficit
for FY1997 will be $144 billion (about two percent of GDP)
.
(CNN, 1996, p. 1)
The CBO projects that under current policies and
current expectations about the economy, the deficit will
creep up from just under two percent of GDP in 1997 to just
over three percent of GDP in 2006. But the real trouble
occurs beginning about 2010, when the first wave of the
baby-boom generation reaches retirement age and "ushers in
an era of unprecedented pressure on federal spending for the
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid programs." (CBO, Aug
1996, p. 1) At that time the number of people working and
paying taxes to support those and other programs will grow
much more slowly than the rate of baby-boomers retiring and
adding to the programs. Under current policies, the
deficits realized by the addition of the baby-boomers to
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid will easily dwarf
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even the largest deficits experienced to date. Indeed, "by
the middle of the next century, they threaten to drive the
federal debt to levels that the economy could not possibly
sustain." (CBO, Aug 1996, p. 1)
Projecting the deficit requires numerous assumptions
concerning such variables as the state of the economy,
unemployment, inflation, federal outlays and revenues.
Thus, future predictions of the deficit are only as good as
the prediction of the underlying independent variables. The
further into the future assumptions are made to characterize
these variables, the greater the probability for errors to
arise, translating to errors in the dependent variable, the
deficit. However, deficit predictions are a useful tool for
evaluating the budgetary impact of proposed legislation, and
the consequences of failing to correct existing legislation.
Table 1 provides CBO's projection of future budget deficits
out to the year 2006.
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY0 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
Deficit $171 $194 $219 $244 $259 $285 $311 $342 $376 $403
% GDP 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3
Table 1. CBO Budget Outlook Under Current-Policy Economic
Assumptions with Discretionary Inflation (billions of
dollars) "From (CBO, Aug 1996, p. 2)"
Table 1 indicates that without some sort of action by
the Congress and Administration, the federal deficit will
again begin to grow, after four straight years of decline.
Based on the current ten year outlook, at least one message
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is clear: any serious efforts to reduce the deficit
significantly will have to include substantial policy
changes. These changes must go well beyond continuing to
restrain spending for annual appropriations, or the so
called discretionary programs. (CBO, Aug 1996, p. 3)
Annual appropriations, by Congress, generally act to
control and restrain discretionary spending. In 1996 this
spending accounted for $53 billion, or approximately one
third of all federal spending, and has been shrinking over
the past 3 years. Mandatory spending, including
entitlements and net interest on the debt, accounted for $1
trillion in 1996, or nearly two thirds of all federal
spending. (CBO, Aug 1996, p. 5) The sheer size of mandatory
spending and its average annual growth rate of 6.8 percent
necessitate action by the Administration and the Congress to
reduce spending to gain control of the deficit. Politically
feasible reductions in discretionary spending simply are not
likely to be sufficient to control the deficit.
D. SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
This thesis will examine the major health care reform
proposals Congress dealt with during the period 1993-1996.
These include the ten reform proposals which emerged from
committees during the 1993-1994 reform period, the reforms
incorporated in the failed 1995 Reconciliation Bill, and the
reform bill passed in 1996 (the Kennedy- Kassebaum Bill) . In
each case, the deficit situation facing Congress at the time
health care reform was engaged and plans to address the
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deficit will be explained, as well as the impact of the
major health care reforms on the federal deficit. The
central purpose of this analysis is to clarify the
relationship between the deficit and congressional health
care reform measures. This thesis will not examine
proposals not specifically addressed by Congress, nor will
it attempt to advocate any specific reform plan or package.
From this analysis, conclusions and implications will be
derived to determine possible lessons learned which may be
used for future reform packages taken up by Congress.
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This thesis will address the financial constraints
involved with health care reform during a period
characterized by resistance to increasing the federal
deficit. Medicare, one of the fastest growing segments of
the federal budget, received particular attention in the
reform debate, especially in the Republican-controlled one
hundred and forth Congress. This thesis will provide
insight on the complex issue of health care reform, and
lessons learned from previous attempts at reform which will
benefit future reform attempts.
15
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II. THE CLINTON HEALTH CARE INITIATIVE, 1993-1994
The 1992 Presidential elections ushered in a new
government era. President-elect, Bill Clinton, "proclaimed
that the defining work of his presidency would be the
overhaul of the health-care system and the elevation of
health care to a civil right." (Rubin, 1993, p. 7) His
crusade was that every American, regardless of age or
current health status, would have access to comprehensive
and affordable health care. This promise set the
legislative agenda that consumed the 103 r Congress.
Donna E. Shalala, President-elect Clinton's choice for
secretary of Health and Human Services, succinctly stated
the new administration's position during Senate confirmation
hearings. "No problem afflicts more families around the
kitchen table more than the radical escalation of health-
care costs, and no problem demands our greater attention as
policy-makers and public servants." (Zuckman, 1993, p. 131)
A. FEDERAL DEFICIT OUTLOOK
In January 1993 the U.S. economy appeared to be on the
rebound, entering a period of self-sustaining growth. GDP
was expected to grow at an annual rate of approximately 3
percent through 1994 --approximately three quarters of the
expected growth rate for this period in the business cycle
following a recession trough. The economy was expected to
grow at an average rate of 2.5 percent over the period 1995-
1998. Although the growth rate was expected to be below
17
normal, it would be sufficient to reduce unemployment from
around 7 percent, at the end of 1992, to below 6.5 percent
by the end of 1994. (CBO, Jan 1993, p. xiii)
The slow pace of the expansion would also help to keep
the inflation rate relatively low through 1998. CBO
estimated that the rate of inflation would average around
2.7 percent through 1994, and was not likely to rise much
through 1998. Additionally, short and long term interest
rates were projected to remain fairly constant through 1993,
with a slight rise in short term interest rates during 1994.
(CBO, Jan 1993, p. 1)
However, the onset of the economic expansion did not
portend relief from budget deficits. Deficits were expected
to remain at or near $300 billion through 1994 and then grow
larger in the second half of the 1990s. "If the current
fiscal course is not changed, 10 years from now the deficit
could reach twice today's level." (CBO, Jan 1993, p. xv)
The CBO estimated the 1993 budget deficit to grow to $310
billion - 5 percent of GDP (see Table 2). (CBO, Jan 1993, p.
xvi)
1991* 1992* 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total
Deficit
270 290 310 291 284 287 319 357
Table 2. Deficit Predictions in billions of dollars, by
fiscal year (* is actual) "From (CBO, Jan 1993, p. xvi)."
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These budget projections assumed that tax laws and mandatory-
spending remained unchanged, and that discretionary spending
in 1994 and 1995 remained within the spending caps imposed
by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990.
These projections painted a grim picture for the
Administration and the Congress. Though federal revenues
and most major spending programs were projected to grow no
faster than GDP, the deficit would continue to spiral
upwards. The deficit was being driven by the two major
health care entitlements—Medicare and Medicaid--whose costs
were exploding. Even if the economy grew one percent more
rapidly than CBO predicted, the deficit would still total
$230 billion in 1998, barring any change in revenue laws or
mandatory spending. (CBO, Jan 1993, pp. xvi-xvii) CBO
stated that "increases in spending for Medicare and Medicaid
are the dominant force pushing deficits back up as the 20
century nears its end. . . Without the rapid growth of
federal health care spending, the deficits would probably
decline steadily as a percentage of GDP." (Statement of
Robert Reischauer, 1994, p. 10)
B. DEFICITS AND THE DEBATE
Health care policy was clearly implicated in the
federal budget deficit. However, there was no pointed and
sustained focus on the deficit consequences of the reform
measures debated by the Clinton Administration between
February 1993 and congressional adjournment in October of
1994. The deficit consequences of various reform measures
19
were a result of the nature of the reform problem and media
treatment of its deficit implications.
This is not to say that the deficit implications of
reform packages were not considered. According to the
Office of Technology Assessment, "estimates of the effect of
health reform on the federal budget are an important part of
the current health reform debate." (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1994, p. 1) Furthermore, legislators were
frequently delayed in considering important reform bills-
-
and complained about the delays- -while the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated the bills' costs.
From a procedural point of view, deficit impacts of the
reform proposals were critical to legislative success. The
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 required that any increased
spending for an entitlement program be offset by either
reductions in other entitlements, new revenues of equal
value, or a combination of reductions and increased
revenues. This requirement, known as the PAYGO rule,
generated significant interest in CBO deficit estimates, the
scorekeepers for PAYGO enforcement
.
1. Complexity of Issues Involved
As a public policy issue, health care reform involves
many things, only one of which is how it affects public
finances. Major reform of health care financing
significantly changes health-care delivery and would require
"trade-offs between patient and doctors, provider and
insurer, business and government - some of them impossible
to manage." (Rubin, 1993, p. 8) "To make health-care
20
services available to everyone at affordable rates opens up
all kinds of questions about what gets covered, who controls
costs and how the health industry is reorganized." (Rubin,
1993, p. 595)
Health care reform is about reconfiguring one seventh
of the U.S. economy. That fraction refers to total 1992
public and private spending for health care in this country.
At $832 billion, that was more than 14 percent of GDP, and
rapidly growing. CBO's baseline projections indicate
national health care expenditures will reach $1.7 trillion
by 2000 (Figure 4) . Elected officials are expected to
respond to voter sensitivity to any and all parts of the








Figure 4 . National Health Expenditure by Source
Funds, CBO Projections 2000 ($ billions)
Source: CBO, July 1993, p. 17.
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More than 20 percent of federal, state and local
revenues are being spent on health care (Cutler, 1994, p.
21) . U.S. health care spending exceeds the size of the
economies of most countries of the world, approximating the
GDP of the UK (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget,
1994, p. 27)
.
2 . Public Perception
The public's perception of the current health care
system is largely influenced by the news media. Newspapers
and television horror stories about the health care industry
have influenced the public's perception and fostered the
demand for complete reconstructive surgery of the system. A
March 12, 1993 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that
74 percent of Americans believed that a complete overhaul of
the health care system was necessary. Nearly 66 percent
said they were willing to pay more taxes to fix the
country's health care system. (Rubin, 1993, p. 595)
However, when Americans are asked what taxes they
would be willing to pay, they generally pick those
that raise the least money. Examples are
increased taxes on cigarettes or alcohol ("sin
taxes") or an increase in the income tax on those
who earn $5 0,000 or more. Support for an income
tax drops from 61 percent to 29 percent when the
increase is on those who earn $25,000 or more.
(Figure 5) (Rubin, 1993, p. 959)
Although there appears to be a clear consensus that the
current system is badly in need of repair or overhaul, there
is not the same consensus on the vehicle for funding the new
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system. This lack of a public mandate set the stage for the
rdhealth care reform debates of the 103 Congress
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Percent in Favor
A - Increased tax on cigarettes and alcohol
B - Tax on incomes over $50,000, for health care
C - Tax on employer contributions to insurance premiums
D - Health payroll tax on employers
E - 5% value-added tax (similar to a national sales tax)
Figure 5. Paying for Health Care: Popularity of Various Tax
Options "From (Rubin, 1993, p. 959)" Source: Kaiser Harris
Election Night Poll and Joint Tax Committee.
3 . Complexity of Health Care System
The complexity of the U.S. Health care system makes
finding the deficit implications of health care reform
extremely difficult. A Brookings Institute study observed
that Americans are served by a "spectacularly complex
administrative maze of public, private, and non-profit
organizations" that finances and delivers health care
(Dilulio, 1994, p. 7)
.
Federal programs for the old, disabled, poor and the
military provide care through Medicare, Medicaid, the VA and
DoD subsystems, while private and non-profit providers
deliver the majority of that care. Many of the 4.5 million
private employers in the U.S. provide health plans, either
directly or through insurance companies. There are no fewer
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than 1,500 public and private insurers in this part of the
health care industry and almost as many (1,350) HMOs and
PPOs . States play a key role in regulating insurance
companies and administering Medicaid. Professionals in
health care- -doctors, nurses, and dentists- -number 600,000,
working in offices, clinics and more than 5,000 community
hospitals (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 1994,
p. 71) .
rd
C. HEALTH CARE BILLS
During the course of the 103""'' Congress many health
care plans were introduced. Only seven made it through the
necessary CBO scoring process before adjournment, in October
1994. Four were reported favorably out of committee, and
only one (the Mitchell bill in the Senate) was actually
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President Clinton's Health Security Act was "a
comprehensive proposal to provide a universal entitlement to
health insurance for a broad range of services and to slow
the growth of spending for health care." (CBO, February
1994, p. xi) It was founded on six fundamental principles:
security, simplicity, savings, choice, quality, and
responsibility. (President's Report, 1993, p. 17)
a. Security
The heart of the President's plan was guaranteed
comprehensive health benefits to all Americans, including
preventive care and prescription drugs. This concept, known
as Universal Coverage, became the President's line drawn in
the sand. Any health care legislation sent to him by
Congress without universal coverage was considered
unacceptable
.
The basis of this tenet was the rising number of
Americans without health insurance, or inadequate health
insurance. In 1992, more than 37 million Americans had no
health insurance, including 9.5 million children. Yet 85
percent of this group belong to families with at least one
working adult (Figure 6) . Millions more had inadequate
coverage such that a serious illness would devastate family
savings and security.
The Administration believed that the health
insurance industry was part of the problem. The insurance
practice of risk selection and underwriting is the core of
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the problem. Insurance companies typically use health
status to separate consumers into health risk categories.
These categories are the basis for setting premium rates or










Figure 6. Who Are the Uninsured ? "From (President's
Report, 1993, p. 3) ."
b. Simplicity
The Clinton plan streamlined administrative
paperwork by requiring all health plans to adopt a standard
claim form, and establish a comprehensive benefits package.
This would alleviate the growing administrative costs facing
many small businesses, clinics, hospitals and doctors'
offices. Administrative cost is one reason why many small
businesses do not have health insurance. (President's




The Health Security Act affected savings and
controlled health care costs by forcing the various health
plans to compete against each other for health alliance
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business. Competition was based on price and quality for a
standard benefits package. Additionally, the plan limited
the rate of growth of insurance premiums to ensure that
costs did not spiral out of control.
Higher health care costs add to the price of goods
and services supplied by American companies and put them at
a real disadvantage in the international market place. For
example, health costs add about $1,100 to the price of every
car produced in the U.S., about twice as much as in Japan.
The U.S. spends far more than any of its foreign competitors
on health care costs, with far less to show for it (i.e.,
the percent of the population without health insurance is
fourteen times greater than the nearest competitor)
.
(President's Report, 1993, pp. 8-10)
d. Quality
The Health Security Act put patient care back into
the hands of the doctors and hospitals, but armed consumers
with health plan quality statistics. This forced health
plans to compete on quality to attract new patients. The
plan also emphasized preventive health care vice treating
patients after they get sick. (President's Report, 1993, p.
19)
e. Choice
The Health Security Act provided choice, allowing
consumers to pick from at least three health plans, no
matter where they worked. Additionally, the plan allowed
consumers to remain with their doctor of choice, or change
health plans if not satisfied.
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f. Responsibility
Responsibility addressed the need for drug
companies, doctors, consumers, and employers to control
prices and discourage frivolous medical malpractice
lawsuits. It also required employers and employees to pay
their fair share for health coverage. (President's Report,
1993, p. 20)
The bottom line is simple: every American
pays when a company or individual fails to assume
responsibility for health coverage or when
insurance companies price people out of the
market. Those who pay for health coverage end up
paying for those who can not or do not . Restoring
responsibility is vital to providing health
security for every American. (President's Report,
1993, p. 15)
2. Gibbons Bill
This health care plan, approved by the House Ways and
Means Committee, was built on a proposal by Representative
Pete Stark (D-California) . The bill preserved the key goal
of the President's plan, providing health insurance for all
Americans
.
Employers were responsible for 80 percent of the family
health insurance costs of their full time employees.
Employers with fewer than 50 employees would receive tax
credits, based on the number of employees, to reduce the
cost of insurance premiums. Individuals were required to
pay the costs not covered by their employers. Self-employed
individuals could deduct 80 percent of their health
insurance costs, beginning in 1998. (Cloud, 1994, p. 1797)
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All health plans were required to offer a set benefits
plan, established by Congress. This package included
everything covered by Medicare, as well as "coverage for
prescription drugs, pregnancy related services, chiropractic
care, mental health and substance abuse treatment." (Cloud,
1994, p. 1797)
The bill established Medicare Part C to provide health
care for the poor currently on Medicaid, the uninsured, and
many employees of small businesses. Additionally, the
Gibbons bill required insurers to cover and renew all
eligible individuals or groups, without exclusions for pre-
existing conditions.
It also established a system of cost controls to limit
health insurance cost growth to the annual growth in GDP.
The cost controls limited insurance reimbursement to
Medicare payment rates in states which failed to limit
growth of health care spending. (Cloud, 1994, p. 1797)
Insurers could operate in any of five markets:
individuals, companies with between two and one hundred
employees, large employers, associations' plans, and health
alliances. In individual and small company market plans,
community- ratings were suggested to hold down the cost of
insurance premiums to the average costs for all people in a
particular area. The bill did not require doctors and
health care providers to join a health care plan. "Health
plans would be required to allow enrollees to receive
29
treatment and reimbursement from providers outside the plan,
as long as the individuals paid a higher portion of the
cost." (Cloud, 1994, p. 1797)
3. Mitchell Plan
The health care bill unveiled by Senate Majority Leader
George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) did not extend affordable
insurance to all Americans. Instead, this bill aimed to
cover 95 percent of Americans by the year 2000. This
placated conservative Democrats, allowing market forces to
increase coverage before requiring government enforcement.
The bill did not require an employer mandate until 2 002, and
even then only targeted a limited group of businesses.
Employers with 25 or more employees were required to pay 50
percent of the cost of their workers' premium. Employers
with less than 25 employees were not required to
participate. The bill provided subsidies for low-income
people to help cover the costs of health insurance. (Rubin,
1994, p. 2205)
"This is a shift in the role of the so-called employer
mandate from chief financing mechanism - its function in
President Clinton's proposal - to enforcement tool." (Rubin,
1994, p. 2205) This role shift increased the financial
burden on the consumer and all but ensured the measure
would not attain 95 percent coverage by 2000. (Rubin, 1994,
p. 2205)
The bill controlled costs by imposing a 25 percent tax
on the amount a plan's premiums exceeded a target rate. The
growth rate of Medicare costs were reduced and it capped the
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annual amount the government could spend on all health care
programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. Individuals or
groups were encouraged but not required to form health
alliances to purchase insurance. If no alliance existed in
an area, the federal government would establish one. All
insurance companies were required to practice community-
rating. (Rubin, 1994, p. 2205)
4. Michel Plan
This plan used market forces to increase individuals'
access to health insurance. It provided subsidies for low-
income children, and possibly pregnant women and other low
income individuals. Health insurance premiums were fully
tax deductible after 1998 for self employed individuals and
individuals not eligible to participate in an employer's
health plan. It also provided tax incentives for medical
savings accounts. (CBO, August 1994, p. 1)
The majority of employers were required to offer, but
not contribute toward, health insurance for their eligible
employees. Insurance companies were limited in their ability
to deny coverage based on pre-existing medical conditions,
and prohibited from denying renewal of coverage based on an
individual's health status. Insurance premiums "could not
vary within each type of plan except by age group,
geographic area, or family size." (CBO, August 1994, p. 2)
This plan would have covered an additional two percent
of the population with health care insurance, primarily
through subsidies for low-income children. (CBO, August
1994, p. 1)
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5. Managed Competition Act
This health reform measure sought to slow health care
cost growth and expand health care insurance. It
restructured the health care markets, provided incentives
for purchasing health insurance, and subsidized health
insurance costs for low-income individuals. (CBO, April
1994, p. ix)
The proposal encouraged people to purchase health
insurance, but did not establish universal coverage.
Employers were required to offer health plans to their
employees, but were not required to pay for them. "Even
without individual or employer mandates, the number of
uninsured people would drop significantly under the
proposal." (CBO, April 1994, p. ix)
The vehicle for health care market reorganization was
regional health plan purchasing cooperatives (HHPCs)
.
Individuals and employees of small businesses (generally
fewer than 100 employees) could purchase a standard benefits
package from accountable health plans (AHPs) through the
HHPC. Strict requirements on AHPs would ensure open
enrollment, limits on pre-existing condition exclusions, and
a modified community-rating system. Premiums could vary
only by age and enrollment type (i.e., individual,
individual and spouse, individual and child, and individual
and family). (CBO, April 1994, p. ix)
Firms with greater than 100 employees also had to offer
their employees the opportunity to purchase health insurance
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from AHPs . However, these firms, because of their size were
not allowed to participate in HHPCs . (CBO, April 1994, p.
ix)
Proposed tax code changes encouraged individuals to
purchase health insurance, while discouraging overly-
generous policies. Health insurance premiums would be tax
deductible up to a "reference premium" (i.e., the premium
for the lowest-cost plan offered through the HHPC)
.
Employers and employees were encouraged to select lower- cost
health plans by limiting the allowable tax deduction. (CBO,
April 1994, p. ix)
Under this plan, Medicare remained essentially
unchanged. However, the Medicaid program was replaced by a
system of federal subsidies to enable low- income people to
purchase acute coverage from AHPs
.
6. Gebhardt's Health Proposal
Gebhardt ' s proposal assured universal health insurance
coverage offering a specified benefits package. People not
currently eligible for Medicare were required to enroll in a
private health plan or a new federal program (Medicare Part
C) . Employers were required to offer health insurance plans
to their employees and pay 80 percent of the premiums.
Individuals were required to pay any health insurance
premiums not covered by their employer. Federal subsidizes
were proposed for low-income individuals. (CBO, December
1994, p. 1)
All employers were required to offer at least two types
of health insurance plans: one with an unlimited choice of
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doctors and the other a managed-care plan limiting the
choice of doctors and the patients' ability to request
specialists and have tests (Rubin, 1994, p. 2143) .
Businesses with fewer than 100 employees had the option of
enrolling in a private insurance plan or the federal
Medicare Part C. Medicare Part C replaced the current
Medicaid program for acute care services.
Health insurance plans were prohibited from pricing
insurance based on pre-existing conditions. All plans sold
to companies employing fewer than 100 employees were
required to use a community rating system. (Rubin, 1994, p.
2143)
7. Senate Finance Committee
The plan crafted by a group of six moderate lawmakers,
led by Senator Chafee (R-Rhode Island) , relied on
marketplace competition and insurance practice changes to
provide affordable health insurance to 95 percent of
Americans by the year 2002. The plan's enforcement
mechanism was a "soft trigger" - -Congress and the President
would be allowed, but not required, to take action. (Rubin,
1994, p. 1707)
The plan restructured the health insurance market to
control costs and improve access to insurance. Consumers
and small businesses could form health insurance purchasing
groups to buy standard benefits insurance package in a
community- rated market. Larger businesses, generally
employing more than 10 workers, could purchase health
insurance based on an experience-rated market. To contain
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costs, the proposal penalized high-cost insurance plans by-
imposing higher taxes. Subsidies were available for low-
income individuals to help defray health insurance costs and
wean them from Medicaid. (CBO, July 1994, pp. 1-4)
"The proposal would add about 2 million people to the
insurance rolls, and the number of uninsured would drop to 8
percent of the population." (CBO, July 1994, p. 1)
8. Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act
This proposal sought to increase access to health
insurance through marketplace reform and financial
incentives for individuals to purchase insurance. Employers
were required to offer health plans, but not to pay for
them. The employer was required to offer at least two
standardized plans: one which did not limit choice of
doctors or health care providers, and one high-deductible
(catastrophic) plan. The federal government subsidized
health insurance for low-income individuals and people
receiving Medicaid, provided they did not receive Medicare
or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) . The proposal made
health insurance premiums fully deductible for self-employed
individuals and partly deductible for individuals whose
employer did not pay for health insurance. (CBO, October
1994, p. 1)
The proposal encouraged, but did not require, states to
establish health plan purchasing organizations (HPPOs)
.
HPPOs market health insurance to consumers and small
businesses in a community-rated market. Larger businesses,
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generally employing more than 100 workers, purchased health
insurance from an experience-rated market. (CBO, October
1994, pp. 2-3)
The proposal also created tax benefits for medical
savings accounts (MSAs) and long-term care insurance.
Generally, individuals who enrolled in catastrophic plans
were able to establish an MSA. However, welfare or SSI
recipients, and individuals whose income is less than the
federal poverty level, were ineligible for MSAs. (CBO,
October 1994, p. 5)
D. HEALTH CARE BILLS AND THE DEFICIT
CBO scored a total of nine health care bills from the
103 rc Congress, eight from 1994 and one- -a single payer
bill--in 1993. However, CBO did not compute the deficit
implications for the single payer bill as part of its
analysis. Therefore, that plan is not included in this
discussion. Two bills (the Bipartisan Health Care Reform
Act and the Gebhardt bill) are included despite the fact
that CBO did not score them until after Congress had
adjourned.
Of the eight bills considered, (see Figure 7) six would
have decreased the cumulative deficit over the ten year
period considered by CBO; two bills- -the President's bill
and the Gibbons bill- -would have increased the cumulative
deficit. However, the two bills increasing the deficit
would have had a relatively small deficit impact.
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The bills which reduced the deficit offered a wide
range of impacts. The Mitchell option which excluded an
employer mandate would have produced a negligible $9.5
billion decrease in the deficit over ten years. The
Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act would reduce total
cumulative deficits by $400.5 billion, a drop of more than
15 percent.
Of the eight bills CBO scored in 1994, only two were
reported out of committee. The Gibbons bill was approved by
the House Ways and Means Committee on June 30, 1994 by a 20
to 18 vote; two days later the Senate Finance Committee
approved its bill by a 12 to 8 margin. Although not a
product of any congressional committee, the Mitchell bill
was the only health care measure considered by one of the
full houses of Congress in 1994. Debate on the Mitchell
bill took place during the second week of August, but it was
pulled from the floor before any votes were taken.
None of the five remaining bills scored by CBO in 1994
received even this limited congressional endorsement. No
congressional committee adopted the Administration's plan.
No committee acted on the Michel bill, the Bipartisan Health
Care Reform Act or the Managed Competition Act, although
portions of the latter were incorporated in the Senate
Finance Committee bill.
The deficit implications of these health care bills
does not appear immediately or directly responsible for
their limited support. The deficit impact had more of an
indirect effect. In an effort to reduce the deficit, most
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of the health care reform bills included stiff provisions
for containing costs and increasing revenues. Such measures
probably more than offset support for provisions that
increased coverage and introduced other desired changes to
the status quo.
Figure 7. Deficit Estimates of Health Care Reform
Proposals, 1993-1994. Source: Congressional Budget Office
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E. CONCLUSIONS
CBO's verdict that health care programs are fueling
future growth in federal deficits was reinforced during the
103 r Congress by the Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement
and Tax Reform. The Commission, a political byproduct of
President Clinton's deficit reduction budget proposal for
Fiscal Year 1994, reviewed the budget implications of
entitlement spending and tax expenditures. Meeting in 1994,
the second year of the health care reform debate, the 32
member panel implicated entitlements, especially health
care, in "the tidal wave of debt built into the future"
(Shear, 1994, p. 1682) .
Noting that the deficit outlook worsens at the end of
the decade, the Commission emphasized the imbalance between
"the government's entitlement promises and the funds it has
available to pay for them" (Bipartisan Commission on
Entitlement and Tax Reform, 1994) . The Commission
highlighted the findings of the Medicare Trustees, who
reported that the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (which pays
a portion of Medicare Part A) "is severely out of balance
and is unsustainable in its present form. . . The Trust Fund
is projected to run out of money by 2001" (Bipartisan
Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform, 1994) . The Co-
chairman of the Commission, Senator Bob Kerrey, expressed
his hope that these findings would increase support for
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health care reform, "serving as a reality check on the cost
of any expanded health entitlements" (Hagar, 1994, p. 1584)
The demise of health care reform during the 103 r
Congress had less to do with the deficit than with the
politics behind the reform process. President Clinton
submitted an in depth and detailed (1342 pages) reform
package. Furthermore, he declared at the beginning of the
debate that universal coverage would be the line drawn in
the sand. He provided Congress little opportunity to refine
health care policy to garner the support needed to pass both
houses of Congress. Additionally, the Administration's
decision to forego a bipartisan approach to health care
reform set the tone for setbacks and the political fiasco
which ensued. Republicans, who were not seriously included
in the reform debate, used parliamentary maneuvers to block
or delay action. Even more damaging to health reform was
the time it took for the Administration to transmit its
proposal to Congress. Conceptualized during the
Presidential elections in 1992, the plan was not presented
to Congress until the end of October 1993. This only left
congressional leaders one year to craft reform legislation
which the President would find suitable. Reform ultimately
fell victim to time pressures at the end of the legislative
session.
In addition, insured Americans seem to have difficulty
empathizing with the uninsured. Sacrifices are required of
the insured to reform the nation's health care system. When
the vast majority of the insured are satisfied with the
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status quo there was no clear mandate to change the system.
Without this mandate, it was relatively easy for those
opposed to major change to block reform. In the end, there
was no political constituency strong or committed enough to
steer the reform legislation through the many bumps and
detours on the road to congressional passage and
presidential signature.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the fact that
health care reform was not enacted during the 103 rc Congress
was nothing less than a "seismic event," representing the
"demise of entitlement politics" (Stein, 1994, p. A14). Uwe
Reinhardt was more modest in his judgment, concluding only
that "America is an incremental country and health care too
has to be done incrementally" (Rubin, 1994, p. 2344).
The difficulty of and necessity for estimating the
budget consequences of health care reform will not
disappear. Health programs have become too strongly linked
to budget deficit. They are the most rapidly growing
entitlement programs, and entitlements are increasingly
associated with uncontrolled spending and rising deficits.
One economist noted that "...health spending is not the edge
of the entitlement problem. It is the essence of the
problem" (Samuelson, 1994, p. 5).
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III. HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE REPUBLICAN
BUDGET REVOLUTION, 1995
After seizing control of Congress for the first time in
40 years the, the Republican- led majority quickly laid out
their ambitious agenda, outlined in their "Contract with
America" . This agenda showcased the Republicans successful
but seemingly contradictory campaign pledge to cut taxes but
still balance the budget. The promise set the stage for new
and often bitter public debates between the Republican-led
Congress and President Clinton on reform of the government-
financed health care system, principally Medicare and
Medicaid. This campaign promise was made more difficult by
Republican guarantees that the budget could be balanced and
taxes cut while keeping Social Security, defense spending
and interest on the federal debt off the table. Thus over
half of what the federal government spends was pledged to be
exempt from cuts, (see Figure 8)
.
A. FEDERAL DEFICIT OUTLOOK
After two years of declining deficits, and the fiscal
year 1995 deficit expected to be the smallest since 1989,
CBO was predicting the deficit to resume an upward trend in
1996. These predictions of increasing deficits (Figure 9)
spurred the Republicans proposal to balance the federal
budget by 2 02.
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Figure 9. Deficit Predictions, by fiscal year (* is actual!
Source: CBO, Aug 1995, p. 22.
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CBO's projections assumed that tax laws and mandatory-
spending remained unchanged, and that discretionary spending
remained within the spending caps, imposed by the Budget
Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990, through 1998.
These projections continued to paint a grim picture for
the Administration and the Congress. Federal revenues were
expected to remain fairly constant as a percentage of GDP
over the next decade, and most major spending programs were
projected to grow no faster than the economy; however, the
deficit was expected to spiral upwards. The deficit was
being driven by the two major health care entitlements-
-
Medicare and Medicaid- -whose costs were continuing to
explode
.
Rising at an annual rate of about 10 percent, total
Medicare and Medicaid outlays were expected to double by
2005. The rapid growth of Medicare explained why the
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A) began
running a deficit in fiscal year 1995; it was expected to be
out of money in 2001. CBO estimated that combined Medicare
and Medicaid spending would nearly equal total discretionary
spending in ten years, or exceed it if discretionary
spending were not allowed to keep pace with inflation. (CBO,
Aug 1995, pp. 22-27)
1. Comparison with Administration's Projections
CBO and 0MB agreed on the projected budget deficit for
fiscal year 1995; however, CBO's deficit estimate for 2002
was $124 billion dollars higher than 0MB' s estimate, and
$214 billion higher by 2005. Differences in economic
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assumptions, along with other technical estimating
differences, created large discrepancies between the two
organizations' deficit estimates (Table 4) . (CBO, Aug 1995,
p. 27)
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
OMB
Baseline
160 185 197 194 202 208 206 216 222 235 248
CBO
Baseline
161 189 218 229 261 288 308 340 375 414 462
Table 4 . Comparison of CBO and OMB Midsession Review Budget
Deficit Baselines Predictions, in billions of dollars.
Source: CBO, Aug 1995, p. 28.
On average, the Administration foresaw faster economic
growth and lower inflation than did CBO. Because inflation,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), affects
indexed benefits and tax brackets, and GDP affects estimates
of taxable income, CBO's assumptions resulted in a larger
gap between the two growth rates. Lower inflation
translated to a smaller rate of growth of indexed benefits
and smaller tax bracket offsets. Faster economic growth
resulted in a larger tax base for federal revenues. The end
result of the differences between CBO and OMB was CBO's
lower expected revenues and higher growth rates for indexed
benefits. This resulted in larger projected deficits and a
less rosy economic outlook. (CBO, Aug 1995, pp. 27-28)
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B. THE BUDGET PROCESS
The annual ritual of crafting a budget for the federal
government has its modern origins from the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This act
established the House and Senate Budget Committees, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the basic legislative
tools used in the budget process.
1. Budget Resolution
The first step in the budget process is congressional
fashioning and adoption of a budget resolution. This
strictly congressional document sets targets for new budget
authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses and the
total federal debt. The document is eventually adopted as
the concurrent resolution after identical versions are
passed by both houses of Congress. However, since the
concurrent resolution never goes to the President for his
signature, it does not have the force of law. Its passage
imposes restrictions on Congress (e.g., in the Senate,
strict time limits on debate for budget resolutions prevent
a filibuster)
.
The concurrent resolution establishes strict spending
targets for the government as a whole. The totals in the
concurrent resolution are used to derive the maximum amount
of money that can be appropriated for a given fiscal year.
Additionally, since 1990 the concurrent resolution has been
used to establish spending totals for defense and non-
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defense discretionary appropriations, under spending caps




The reconciliation process was originally designed to
implement the spending and tax policy decisions in the
concurrent budget resolution. However, it has since come to
focus upon a single category of federal spending:
entitlements
.
Reconciliation enables Congress to equally consider all
spending, as well as taxes, as a means of achieving deficit
reduction. The larger the share of deficit reduction
assigned to entitlement cuts and tax increases by the
concurrent budget resolution, in relation to discretionary
spending cuts, the more important reconciliation becomes.
Changes made to entitlement programs and tax laws by
the cognizant House and Senate Committees are wrapped up
into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill. This bill is
sent to the House and Senate floors, where it is handled
under special rules.
Typically, the arduous job of passing a reconciliation
bill has kept Congress in session well after its expected
adjournment date. Between 1990 and 1996, Congress
successfully used the reconciliation process three times.
Twice, in 1990 and 1993, Congress adopted enormous multi-
year packages of tax and spending measures, used to reshape
the fiscal landscape.
48
In 1990, with deficits soaring, Congress and the
President crafted a five year deficit reduction plan. The
cornerstone of the plan was the reconciliation bill which
promised to cut the deficit by $482 billion over five years.
The bill provided for deficit reduction by relying on
savings and tax increases, and included a five year budget
process. This budget process included caps on discretionary
spending and pay-as-you-go rules for taxes and entitlements.
(Cranford, 1995, p. 2715)
In 1993, deficit fever was again rampant in Congress.
Democratic leaders in Congress advised the President that
the first order of business was a serious deficit reduction
package. The President and Congress pushed through a $433
billion dollar deficit reduction package, relying nearly
half and half on spending reductions and new taxes. This
package, because of the new taxes, did not garner a single
Republican vote, twice requiring the Vice President to break
tie votes in the Senate. The final reconciliation bill
continued most of the rules pioneered in the 1990
reconciliation bill, and extended the discretionary spending
caps through 1998. (Cranford, 1995, p. 2715)
C. FY 1996 BUDGET
In the 1990 budget deal, then President Bush brokered a
deficit reduction package. It relied heavily on defense
cuts and tax increases, while allowing for increased non-
defense spending and unlimited growth in entitlement
spending. By 1995, the politically volatile health
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entitlements had ballooned to growth rates of 10 percent or
more per year, while spending for some domestic programs had
increased two to three times the rate of inflation. (Hager,
1995, p. 1365)
The fiscal year 1996 Republican budget would stop all
this. The Republican budget promised to balance the budget
in seven years, both by controlling the growth of two of the
largest entitlement programs, Medicare and Medicaid, and by
sharply reducing the size of the federal government. This
budget proposal was all the more unique in that it proposed
to do all this while at the same time providing for a huge
tax reduction package for the American people.
1. The Republican Budget Proposal
The Republican's plan would use the reconciliation
process, not as a minor adjustment in tax and spending
policy, but as an aggregate tax and spending measure
designed to revamp federal spending for years to come. In a
clearly partisan fashion, the Republican-controlled Congress
voted on June 29, 1995 for a seven-year GOP blueprint to
balance the budget (see Table 5) . The budget resolution
locked the Congress into a process requiring committees to
produce $894 billion in spending cuts by 2002.
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
House -156 -176 -140 -134 -108 -61 0.5
Senate -157 -128 -98 -86 -74 -30 1.3
Final
Conference
-170 -152 -116 -100 -81 -33 6.4
CBO
Baseline
-189 -218 -229 -261 -288 -308 -340
Table 5. Deficit/Surplus Dollars in Billions Projected by
the Conference Report in the Fiscal Year 1996 Budget
Resolution. Source: Fiscal 1996 Budget Resolution (H Con
Res 67 - H Rept 104-159) and CBO August 1995.
The Republicans' huge deficit reduction package was not
much larger than the 1990 and 1993 deficit reduction
packages, when measured in 1995 constant dollars. The
Republican package called for $894 billion in deficit
reduction over seven years, but would only realize $537
billion in the first five years. Compare that with the
deficit reduction package backed by President Bush in 1990
($560 billion in 1995 dollars) and President Clinton's
1993 deficit reduction plan ($459 billion in 1995
dollars) . (Hager, 1995, p. 1299)
The difference was how the various packages realized
deficit reduction. Both the 1990 and 1993 packages relied
heavily on tax increases and defense cuts. The Republican
plan relied on slowing the growth of entitlements and non-
defense cuts, while providing for tax reductions and modest
defense increases. (Hager, 1995, p. 1299)
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a. Medicare
The budget resolution committed the Republicans to
reducing Medicare by $270 billion over a seven year period.
How the reductions were to be carried out was not clear.
There were differences between the House and Senate
versions, and even within the respective chambers, on how to
meet the Medicare budget resolution goals.
In their quest to hold down the growth of
Medicare, the Republicans looked at various proposals
designed to set a flat federal fee for health care and
replace the open ended guarantee of coverage. The current
system required the government to pay for all qualified
expenses. However, by changing Medicare to a defined
contribution or voucher system, Congress would give itself
the ability to control costs. In a defined contribution
system, Congress would provide recipients a predetermined
payment or voucher, to help defray their costs of a private
insurance policy. Payments would be adjusted for age, sex,
geographic location and institutional status, which means
some beneficiaries would receive higher payments than
others. "Only by eventually moving all seniors to privately
managed systems operating under a defined federal
contribution could the federal government truly restrain
cost growth and drive efficiency into the system," said
Thomas A. Scully, president of the Federation of American
Health Systems. (Fraley, 1995, pp. 2189-2190) Proponents of
the defined federal contribution approach argued that giving
seniors choices encouraged them to shop around for the
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health package which would meet their needs. This would
encourage competition. These were themes reminiscent of the
President's health care reform package in 1993. (Fraley,
1995, pp. 2189-2190)
Other alternatives for slowing Medicare growth
were block grants, higher co-payments and deductibles,
reduced payments to providers, and new formulas for spending
federal dollars.
Republicans were clearly aware of the dangers they
faced in attempting to change a very popular social benefit
for the elderly. However, they were convinced that if they
could produce a program that actually balanced the budget,
without draconian cuts in Medicare, and simultaneously
provided a tax cut, they furthered their chances of
maintaining power in Washington. According to House Speaker
Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), in a June 28 interview with the
Atlanta Constitution, "If we solve Medicare, I think we will
govern for a generation" (Fraley, 1995, p. 1900)
.
However, Republicans were very sensitive to
Democratic attacks in the press. For example, House
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) charged that "these
cuts will devaste seniors for decades" (Fraley, 1995, p.
1900) . Republicans contended that they were not cutting
Medicare, just controlling its growth from budget busting
levels of 10 percent per year to about 6 percent (see Figure
10) . They also pointed to a report from the Medicare Board
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of Trustees warning that the Hospital Insurance trust fund
(Medicare Part A) would be broke by 2002 if changes were not
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Figure 10. Medicare Growth Under Budget Resolution.
Source : House Budget Committee
.
The conference agreement on the deficit reduction
budget reconciliation measure (HR 2491 - H Rept 104-350)
,
was finalized in November (one and a half months after the
start of the new fiscal year) . It laid out the Republicans'
plan to overhaul Medicare (Figure 11) . The plan emphasized
market forces and encouraged seniors to move to managed care
institutions, including Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) . Medicare beneficiaries would be allowed to keep the
current Medicare system, but would have additional options.
They could opt for joining a managed care institution,
buying a high deductible insurance policy combined with a
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medical savings account (MSA), using a network of providers,
or joining union or association health plans.
The monthly premium for Medicare Part B, which was
scheduled to drop from 31.5 percent of the program's costs
to 25 percent in 1996, would remain at 31.5 percent for the
seven year period. Means testing would become part of the
Medicare Part B payment system. Single beneficiaries
earning $60,000 in annual incomes and couples earning
$90,000 in income would face higher costs. The costs would
gradually increase until the subsidy ended at $110,000 for
singles and $150,000 for couples. (Fraley, 1995, p. 3536)
Changes in the payment system to hospitals and
providers would modify the reimbursement amounts for
inpatient and outpatient hospital costs. This would reduce
the amount of money spent on capital costs for hospitals and
nursing homes. Additionally, payment reductions would be
made to all hospitals that served a higher percentage of
indigent patients, on a shifting scale, from 5 percent to 30
percent, over the seven year period. Skilled nursing
facilities would transition to a prospective payment system
from the current method of paying the facilities on a
"reasonable cost" basis. Under a prospective payment
system, payments for health care services would be at a
fixed rate based on a prenegotiated amount. Thus nursing
facilities would face a negotiated fee structure vice the
more open ended reasonable cost basis. (Fraley, 1995, pp.
3536-3537)
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The Republican plan called for a fail-safe
enforcement mechanism. If budget targets were not met, then
the fail-safe mechanism would automatically cut payments to
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Total Savings Over Seven
Years: $270 Billion
Figure 11. Distribution of Medicare Savings in the
Republican Reconciliation Bill.
Source: "Healthcare," Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys,
Jan 11, 1996.
b. Medicaid
The budget resolution looked for $182 billion in
Medicaid spending reductions over a seven year period. This
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was considered to be politically less risky than the
Medicare reduction, mainly because of the public's
perception about whom the program helped. Public perception
links Medicaid to welfare, i.e., it is a program for the
poor.
The proposals considered to reduce the federal
government's Medicaid costs included capping spending growth
at a rate substantially less than 10 percent and turning the
program into state block grants, with fewer federal
restrictions or mandates. State governors, in general,
supported block grants and more control over coverage and
services offered. States argue that they are in a better
position to understand and address the needs of their
residents. According to Dr. Michael D. McKinney, Director
of Health and Human Services in Texas, "we are looking for
minimal restrictions, except to go forth and do good"
(Fraley, 1995, p. 1639)
.
The conference agreement on the budget
reconciliation measure (HR 2491 - H Rept 104-350) finalized
the Republicans' plan to overhaul Medicaid. The agreement
scaled back the required savings target from $182 billion to
$163.4 billion over seven years. The central elements of
the plan were to turn the program over to the states, in the
form of block grants, and give them far more flexibility in
deciding whom to cover and at what level. However, language
in the report would require states to provide some form of
support for pregnant women and children under the age of 13.
(Fraley, 1995 p. 3539)
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Negotiators agreed to distribute the federal pool
of dollars, one of the most contentious aspects of the plan,
on a needs based formula. This formula would take into
account the number of poor residents in a state, the state
health care cost index, and the state's case load. Every
state would have been guaranteed minimum growth rates in
federal dollars, ranging from 3.5 percent in 1997 to 2.5
percent in 1999 and 2 percent subsequently. The maximum
growth rate would have been 9 percent in 1997 and 5.33
percent in later years. (Fraley, 1995, p. 3540)
2. President's Budget Proposal
Compared to the Republican's proposals for a $200
billion five year tax cut and balancing the budget in seven
years, President Cinton's budget proposal was decidedly
modest. In his budget, submitted February 6 , the
President proposed middle class tax cuts of $63 billion over
five years. These tax cuts would be financed by $144
billion in spending cuts, producing a net deficit reduction
of $81 billion. This deficit reduction was less than a
fifth of what his 1993 budget package produced, and was not
nearly enough to set the budget on a balanced path. (Hager,
1995, p. 403)
In fact, the President's budget was little more than a
mere legal formality (Figure 12) . Missing from the
President's budget were the details and attachments normally
associated with the executive branch's budget submission.
The President was cautious after the demonization of his
1993 deficit reduction plan and the derailing of his 1994
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health care reform proposals. He sent a clear message to
the new congressional leadership: it is now your turn to
take the ball and run with it. In a shot at the new
congressional leadership, President Clinton said, "anyone
can offer a tax cut or propose investment. The hard part,
of course, is paying for them." (Hager, 1995, p. 403)
Domestic \^
/ Medicare & f $266B(17tf* /\
/ Medicaid '
$271B(17%) \ /^National.> \
Other"-—«^^
Mandatory
\ / Defense \j/ $262B(ie%»
f184B{11 >«^^^
w International
X^ Net Interest / Social Security / ^s.. Affairs
\ $257B(16%) / $351B(22%) / $21(1%)
Figure 12. President Clinton's Proposed Budget,
February 1995, in billions of dollars. "From (Hager,
1995, p. 404)"
The President's budget called for $1.6 trillion in
spending for 1996, up 4 . 8 percent from 1995. Overall
spending would increase at an annual rate of 4.3 percent,
driven mainly by entitlement programs (growing at an annual
rate of 6.7 percent) and interest on the national debt
(growing at an annual rate of 4.8 percent) . In contrast,
domestic spending would decrease over the same period of
time, and defense spending would grow slightly, although
less than the inflation rate. (Hager, 1995, p. 404)
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The net effect of the President's budget was to
continue the trend of entitlement growth. Projections
showed that by 2000, entitlements would absorb about 55
percent of the budget, while discretionary appropriations
would shrink from 34 percent to 2 9 percent of the budget.
(Hager, 1995, p. 404)
On June 13 , President Clinton, in a brief, nationally
televised address, quickly shifted gears after the House and
Senate approved the budget resolution mandating a seven year
deficit reduction plan. Declaring, "it is time to clean up
this mess, (Hager, 1995, p. 1715)" the President agreed for
the first time in principle to work toward a balanced
budget. After months of verbal sparring and demonizing the
Republicans' plan to balance the budget, the President
unveiled his proposal to balance the federal budget by the
year 2005, three years later than the Republican proposal.
The President had transformed the budget debate from a
partisan argument about the wisdom of balancing the budget
to a debate on how to do it, and how fast.
The Republicans, for their part, happily embraced the
President's implicit approval of their fundamental goals -
to reduce the size of government, balance the budget, cut
taxes and sharply reduce spending on Medicare and Medicaid.
However, they were more than a bit skeptical of the numbers
used in the President's budget and its substance. (Hager,
1995, p. 1715)
The President's budget marked a tremendous- -and to some
Democrats, acutely embarrassing- -shift of policy. The
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Democrats, including the President, had repeatedly claimed
that the Republican agenda which mixed a tax cut with a
balanced budget was impossible and unwise. The President's
budget largely shadowed the Republican approach, with the
notable difference in timing and scope. A major difference
was that the President's plan would have preserved the
signature initiatives of his administration, such as
spending on education, the National Service program, health
research and anti-crime programs. (Rubin, 1995, p. 1718)
The President's proposal provided for $520 billion in
deficit reduction over seven years and $1.1 trillion over
ten years, as scored by the more optimistic OMB. His
proposal for a modest tax cut of $105 billion over ten years
was targeted at middle to low income families. These cuts
were mainly focused on tax credits for children, college
tuition deductions, and expanding tax-deferred contributions
to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
.
The plan included modest savings in Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare savings were expected to total $128
billion, of which 70 percent would fall on hospitals, and
the balance on lower reimbursement rates for doctors. The
President combined these Medicare cuts with a small, $28.3
billion, expansion in health insurance coverage. Medicaid
savings were expected to total $54 billion. Savings were
captured by capping the program's expenditures on a per
capita basis; Medicare maintained its status as an
entitlement program. Discretionary spending would be cut by
$200 billion, of which $197 billion came from non-defense
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programs. The cuts in most domestic spending programs
averaged 2 percent, except for a handful of favored
Administration programs. These programs actually saw slight
increases. (Rubin, 1995, p. 1718)
The Republicans charged that the President's budget
would not come close to balancing the budget, a charge
supported by CBO analysis of the budget released June 16 .
This analysis indicated that the President's budget left a
deficit of $209 billion in 2005, the year the President
projected a balanced budget. (Hager, 1995, p. 1719)
3 . Budget Summit
On December 6 , over two months into the new fiscal
year, President Clinton vetoed the Republican reconciliation
bill. This action was not much of a surprise. The
President had indicated in June that provisions of the bill
were unacceptable, chiefly those pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid savings. The President's veto initiated a series
of budget summits between the White House and the Republican
congressional leadership. These talks advanced the public
notion that a budget agreement could be reached, and that
the outcome would be a federal budget which placed the
country on a glide path to a balanced budget. These views
were reinforced by news that the President had agreed to
balancing the budget in seven years, although the President
stopped short of agreeing to use CBO figures.
On December 15 , budget talks collapsed under angry
recriminations by both sides. The Republicans dismissed the
newest White House offer as nothing more than book -cooking
;
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President Clinton accused the Republicans of demanding
"unconscionable" cuts in health care programs for the poor
and elderly, namely Medicaid and Medicare. The enraged
Republicans indicated they would not approve another stopgap
spending bill (a series of which had been funding the
government since the beginning of the new fiscal year) until
the President met their minimum condition for a budget
compromise. This condition was balancing the budget in
seven years using CBO projections. (Hager, 1995, 3789)
The two sides had been inching closer together when
negotiations broke off although they were still miles apart.
A CBO re-estimate of the Republican reconciliation bill,
vetoed by the President, and the President's proposal
submitted December 7 fc (Table 6) , indicated that only the
Republicans' budget achieved balance. The President's
proposal left a deficit of $115 billion, even after CBO gave
the proposal credit for an economic dividend. CBO indicated
this dividend would only occur if the budget was balanced.
Category Republicans Clinton Difference
Discretionary $-408 $-240 $168
Medicare $-226 $-97 $129
Medicaid $-133 $-37 $96
Poverty Programs $-87 $-41 $46
Other Mandatory $-35 $-4 $31
Tax Cuts (Net) $218 $81 $-137
Debt Service $-80 $-46 $33
Total $-750 $-385 $365
Table 6. The Budget Gap, Budget Projections over Seven Years
as Scored by CBO. "From (Hager, 1995, 3792)".
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Partisan bickering continued with brief glimpses of
light through the Christmas holiday. Prior to breaking for
Christmas, the Republican- led Congress voted a continuing
resolution (CR) to partially fund the government through
January 3 r . The CR would fund the District of Columbia and
provide for veterans and welfare benefits, while locking a
quarter of a million federal employees out of work. (Hager,
1995, p. 3874)
On January 6 , after resisting for nearly a year,
President Clinton agreed to the Republicans' minimum
condition for a budget compromise- -a plan to balance the
budget in seven years as estimated by CBO. In return,
Republicans sent him a CR to fully fund the government
through January 26 c . It finally appeared as if the two
sides were serious about reaching a budget compromise.
However, as hard as it was to get the two sides to this
point, it appeared even harder to get them to agree on the
policies that would produce the budget savings. This divide
on policy issues was amplified by remarks from President
Clinton.
If this is about balancing the budget we could do
it in about 15 minutes tomorrow afternoon. The
issue here is over policies involved in Medicare
and Medicaid, our opposition to raising taxes on
the lowest paid working people...if we are going to
walk away from the fundamental commitment of
Medicare we ought to have an election about that.
(Rubin, 1996, p. 89)
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The divide was also described by the Speaker of the House,
on a January 10 visit to Wyoming.
I think the odds are better than even, as of
today, that there will be no agreement, and I find
that a very difficult prospect. It may just be
that we need one more election; it may literally
be that the Clinton administration cannot agree to
the kind of decentralization and lower spending
and lower taxes that we represent. (Rubin, 1996,
p. 89)
4. Reconciliation Failure
Negotiations between the White House and Congress
continued through March, with each side compromising a
little. However, the policy issues dividing the two sides
could not be overcome. Desperate to avoid a third partial
shutdown of the federal government, both sides agreed to a
stopgap bill that would fund the government through the
April congressional recess. This, in effect, signaled the
end of the Republicans' attempt to balance the budget in
seven years, drastically reducing the size of government,
and providing for a middle class income tax cut. In the
end, the two sides had come tantalizingly close in numbers.
Their split on Medicare had closed from $129 billion to as
little as $30 billion over seven years. Their split on
Medicaid had closed from almost $100 billion to just $26
billion over seven years. However, the narrowing
differences were misleading, since they camouflaged deal-
breaking policy disagreements. (Hager, 1996, pp. 149-150)
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D. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions by CBO that growth in federal
expenditures for health care, principally Medicare and
Medicaid, were fueling federal deficits led the Republican-
controlled Congress to tackle these entitlement programs.
In their Contract with America, the Republicans pledged to
balance the federal budget, dramatically reduce the size and
scope of the federal government , and reduce taxes for the
American people. This promise was made against a backdrop
in which the Republicans pledged that the budget could be
balanced and taxes cut while keeping Social Security,
interest on the debt, and defense spending off the table.
Thus over half of federal expenditures were protected.
Budget proposals and debate in the 104 ' Congress were
strictly partisan, with little regard for the priorities or
policy views of the Democrats. The strictly partisan nature
of the fiscal 1996 budget process underscores the lessons of
the 1993-1994 health care reform debate. In the case of the
FY1996 budget, congressional Democrats, who were not
seriously considered in the budget process, used the media
and public fear to force compromise with the Republican
majority. The Republican leadership, believing their
Contract with America provided them the public mandate to
shape the direction of federal spending, launched a campaign
designed to reshape the structure of the social safety net
for the elderly and the poor. However, the process became
entangled with the notion of tax cuts for the rich; it all
but ignored saving the safety net for future generations.
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Thus, the budget became easy prey for attacks by the
Democratic leadership and the ultimate fears perceived by
the public.
The failure of the fiscal year 1996 reconciliation bill
to balance the budget and stave off the growth of federal
health care programs will not end the issue. The federal
role in financing health care will remain a political hot
button for two reasons. First, public pressure to balance
the budget will keep Medicare and Medicaid in the public
spotlight. These two programs represented more than 22
percent of federal spending in 1996 (excluding interest on
the debt) ; they are projected to grow to more than 2 7
percent of federal spending by the year 2002. (CBO, Aug
1996, p. 2) Additionally, the increase in spending on
Medicare and Medicaid, as a percent of GDP, accounts for all
the projected increase in the federal deficit between 1996
and 2002. (CBO, Aug 1996, p. 2) Second, the retirement of
the baby boom generation, starting in 2010, portends large
increases in federal spending for Medicare and Medicaid.
For these two reasons, the problem associated with federal
health care financing will not go away. (Aaron, 1996, p. 35)
The end result of the Republican budget was that the
budget deal became entangled in positioning for the make-or
break 1996 presidential elections. The Republicans were
hoping to consolidate their hold on Congress and win back
the White House, while Democrats hoped to turn back the
Republican revolution and win back control of the Congress.
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Democrats and their allies hoped to paint the
Republicans as Medicare's undertakers, while largely-
ignoring their own overhaul proposals. National advertising
campaigns suggested that the Republicans wanted to savage
the program, removing the health care safety net "earned" by
the elderly. "We worked all our life, and then you get old
enough to enjoy it a bit and it is taken away from you and
you have nothing. I don't think it is fair," said Charlotte
McChesney, 75. (Rich, 1995, p. 6) According to William
Kristol, a conservative political strategist and editor of
the Weekly Standard, "In a courageous but foolhardy way,
Republicans touched the third rail" (Georges, 1996, p. A20)
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IV. GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS: HEALTH
CARE REFORM IN 1995/96
Early in 1995, House Republicans, buoyed by their
success and looking beyond their "Contract with America,"
turned their sights to an issue which had eluded President
Clinton and the Democrats in 1994: health care reform. Five
House Republicans, all chairmen of key committees or
subcommittees, sponsored three bills to make health
insurance easier to obtain and more affordable. The three
bills were considerably more modest than the 1993-94 plans
to revamp the health care system. The central aim of each
bill was to expand health insurance coverage, making it more
difficult for insurance companies to deny insurance to
anyone, including small businesses and people who shift jobs
or have pre-existing conditions. At the same time, the
bills encouraged businesses to offer health insurance.
These themes enjoyed bipartisan support during 1994.
(MacPherson, 1995, p. 944)
A. FEDERAL DEFICIT OUTLOOK
After two years of declining deficits, and CBO
estimating a third consecutive year, the outlook for the
immediate future was much less optimistic. CBO projected
that the deficit would rise from an estimated 1995 low of
$161 billion to $340 billion by 2002. CBO projections
spurred the Republican Congress to push for a balanced
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budget constitutional amendment and a proposal to balance
the federal budget by 2002. (CBO, Aug 1995, P. 22)
B. EARLY HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS IN THE HOUSE
The three health reform bills, sponsored by House
Republican committee and subcommittee chairmen, had a common
theme: making health insurance more affordable and easier to
obtain. These were issues Democrats attempted to address in
1994. Although the Republican leadership was leery of
addressing these issues again, they felt compelled to act
because health insurance costs were high and millions of
Americans were without insurance. Poll after public opinion
poll ranked health reform high on the list of concerns,
along with crime. (MacPherson, 1995, p. 945)
The early Republican bills were the Basic Health Care
Reform Act, the ERISA Targeted Health Insurance Reform Act,
and the Bliley-Bilirakis Plan.
1. The Basic Health Care Reform Act
This bill increased access to insurance for individuals
and small companies. It required insurance companies to
offer health insurance, with a guarantee of renewal, to all
individuals and small companies who could pay the premiums.
It also prevented insurance restrictions due to pre-existing
conditions
.
Insurance companies were required to offer at least two
plans: a standard benefits package with a low deductible and
a high deductible plan. People with high deductible plans
could set up Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) , similar to
70
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) . Individuals could
make pretax contributions to these plans, from which they
would pay their deductible. MSAs were designed for high
deductible insurance plans, those low premium plans which
require individuals to pay large out of pocket costs before
insurance coverage starts. (MacPherson, 1995, p. 945)
Finally, the bill changed the medical malpractice
system, capping at $250,000 the non-economic damages that
could be recouped in a lawsuit. (MacPherson, 1995, p. 945)
2. ERISA Targeted Health Insurance Reform Act
This bill increased the number of small business owners
offering employees health insurance. It accomplished this
by making health insurance more affordable.
Allowing small businesses to form health purchasing co-
operatives with individuals and small employers increases
their bargaining power with insurance companies. This
ultimately lowers prices. The bill removed legal barriers
that precluded small business owners from joining health
purchasing co-operatives. Additionally, prices were reduced
by removing state-mandated minimum health benefits packages.
(MacPherson, 1995, p. 945)
3. Bliley-Bilirakis Plan
This bill combined the provisions of the two other
bills into one plan. It included provisions for MSAs,




C. HEALTH REFORM IN THE 104 th CONGRESS
With no clear favorite among the early Republican
proposals, House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) appointed a
health care group to review the options and issues.
Although the proposed measures had bipartisan support in
1994 (during the 103 rc Congress) , the new faces in the 104 t
Congress promised to make for a harder sell. The 104
Congress was far more conservative. Bills emphasizing
insurance reforms required additional government regulation.
This breached the ideological inclinations of many newly
elected Republicans.
Additionally, deficit reduction fever ran rampant
through Congress in 1995. Any serious health care proposal
would have to be deficit neutral. Although it was believed
that the three Republican bills would have little or no
budgetary impact, they never gained momentum in the House.
Thus they were never scored by CBO. To further complicate
the process, Republican congressional aides stressed that
staff growth had been modest since the Republicans gained
the House majority. Thus there was not adequate staffing to
simultaneously address health care issues and the budget
reconciliation process. (MacPherson, 1995, p. 946)
Hope for reform lay in the Senate. Although health
care reform was part of the Senate's version of the
"Contract with America," the chamber was slow to move on the
issue. It was widely believed that Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole (R-Kan.) would write the Republican health care
reform bill, in conjunction with his bid for the Republican
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Presidential nomination. However, in late March 1995,
Senator Dole countered this belief when he said, "I'll be
working on it, but I won't be writing it all myself"
(MacPherson, 1995, p. 946)
.
1. Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill
The Senate unveiled its attempt at health care reform
in late July 1995. The Health Insurance bill (S 1028)
sponsored by Senators Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.) and
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) had 12 cosponsors, cutting a
wide ideological swath in the Senate. This cross-section of
support raised hopes for modest health care reform. The
bill limited the ability of insurance companies to withhold
medical coverage from people with pre-existing conditions to
no more than 12 months, and made it easier for workers to
get and maintain coverage. The provision guaranteeing
coverage made it easier for workers to change jobs or start
their own businesses without losing health insurance. In
health care circles, this attribute is known as
"portability." (Fraley, 1995, p. 2191)
The Senate Labor and Human Relations Committee
unanimously approved the Health Insurance bill (S 1028) on
August 2, 1995. This bill included the following
provisions
.
The bill prohibited insurers and employers from denying
or limiting a worker's coverage under a group health plan
for more than 12 months because of a pre-existing medical
condition diagnosed or treated within the last six months.
After the 12 month period, no pre-existing condition limits
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could be imposed, even if the person changed jobs or
insurance plans. The same protection was provided to
individuals who switched from a group to an individual plan.
(Fraley, 1995, p. 2191)
After 18 months of group health insurance coverage,
workers were guaranteed access to individual insurance
plans. Additionally, insurers were required to renew group
and individual policies as long as premiums had been paid
and the policy holder had not received coverage through
deception. (Fraley, 1995, p. 2191)
The bill created incentives for small businesses and
individuals to form health insurance coalitions and
negotiate with providers. Forming health insurance
purchasing coalitions would allow smaller players in the
health care market to negotiate on an equal basis with large
companies. (Fraley, 1995, p. 2191)
Finally, the bill certified continuing coverage to
disabled workers and their families. (Fraley, 1995, p. 2191)
2. Post Committee Action
After the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
approved the Health Insurance bill (S 1028) on August 2 n ,
it stalled in the Senate. Senate inaction reflected the
more pressing matters occupying the Senate leadership, i.e.,
FY 1996 reconciliation legislation.
The health bill languished within the Senate until
after reconciliation failed in March 1996. In April 1996,
the bill grabbed the full attention of the congressional
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leadership of both parties. This bill represented the last
best hope for modest health care reform in the 104 th
Congress
.
On April 23 r , 1996, the Senate unanimously passed the
Health Insurance bill (HR 3103 formerly S 1028) . However,
the overwhelming vote of 100-0 masked the controversy and
political maneuvering associated with the bill.
Prior to the Senate vote, Senate Majority Leader, Bob
Dole (R-Kan.) attempted to insert a controversial provision
providing for MSAs into the bill. This provision was
defeated by a vote of 52-46. Five Republicans- -including
bill sponsor Nancy Kassebaum, the junior senator from
Kansas- -voted with a united block of Democrats to remove
MSAs from the Dole amendment
.
This defeat did not end the controversy surrounding
MSAs. The House version of the bill included provisions for
MSAs, thus providing Dole an opportunity to prevail in
conference. Dole clearly had the upper hand in conference.
He had the support of House conferees, and a majority of
Senate conferees, whom he could select. (Langdon, 1996, p.
1170)
Proponents of MSAs, (mostly Republicans) argued that
the accounts restrained costs by making consumers more
prudent with their health care dollars. This awareness
could force providers to be more competitive and cost
effective in their services. (Fraley, 1995, p. 2375)
Critics, mostly Democrats, argued that the accounts
appealed more to the wealthier and healthier segment of the
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population. The sicker and poorer segment of the population
would remain in traditional coverage, thus causing premiums
to increase. Pete Stark (D-Calif.) argued that,
MSAs are simply a scheme to transfer money from
sick people to healthy people and from those in
lower tax brackets to those in higher brackets.
And worse, they undermine the entire health care
system by making health insurance unaffordable for
those who are likely to be sick. (Fraley, 1995, p.
2375)
The President was counted among the critics of MSAs. The
President's chief of staff, Leon Panetta, and Vice President
Al Gore, said the President would veto any legislation
containing MSAs
.
The issue of MSAs seemed destined to derail the Health
Insurance bill. Through procedural motions Democrats, led
by Senator Edward E. Kennedy (D-Mass.), refused to allow
Senator Dole to appoint conferees . Senator Kennedy was
adamant that Dole name conferees reflecting the Senate's
views on the issue, not the House's. Without assurances
from Dole not to stack the conference, Democrats would
prevent the conference from officially beginning.
On July 25 , more than a month after Senator Dole
retired from the Senate to pursue presidential ambitions, a
compromise was reached. With a handshake between a liberal
senator and a conservative House member, the Congress was
positioned to achieve something that had eluded it for
years: health insurance reform. Senator Kennedy reached
agreement with Representative Bill Archer (R-Texas)
,
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chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, on a pilot
program for MSAs . Under the agreement , MSAs would be
available to a limited population for four years, after
which Congress would vote to expand eligibility to everyone.
After this compromise, Senator Kennedy allowed the naming of
Senate conferees.
The agreement was significant, for it cleared the last
major hurdle to health insurance reform. The conference
committee submitted final legislation which was approved by
both Houses of Congress, and sent to the President for
signature eight days after the agreement
.
3 . CBO Scoring
CBO analysis of the Conference Report on HR 3103, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
better known as the Kassebaum-Kennedy bill was completed
August I s , 1996. The next day both the House and Senate
approved and sent the legislation to the President for
signature. Although it was assumed the bill would be deficit
neutral, it had not been officially scored (by CBO) until
the day before House and Senate approval. CBO and the Joint
Tax Committee estimated that the legislation would reduce
the federal deficit by $52 million in 1996 and by $5.2
billion over the period 1996-2002 (see Table 7) . Thus,
unlike earlier health care reform efforts (during 103 rc
Congress) the Kassebaum-Kennedy bill was expected to reduce
the deficit.
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 96-02
Deficit $-52 $-275 $79 $-773 $-1346 $-1428 $-1454 $-5249
Table 7. Deficit Effects of Kassebaum-Kennedy bill, in
millions of dollars.
Source: CBO, August 1, 1996.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It took Congress well over a year from the time
Kassebaum and Kennedy first introduced their bill until they
finished work on what was viewed as a widely popular
measure. The success of Kassebaum-Kennedy was in part due
to the failure of the Clinton health care reform initiative.
Determined not to make the same mistakes and repeat history,
Senators Kassebaum and Kennedy put together a simple plan
based on the ideas which had garnered bipartisan support
during the health care debates of 1993-1994. They fought to
keep extraneous attachments from the bill, and for a while
were successful. The bill sailed through their committee on
a unanimous vote August 2 n , 1995. Thereafter it stalled,
enduring political infighting, presidential campaign
politics, and powerful interest group opposition. (Langdon,
1996, p. 2197)
Having failed to pass health care reform two years
earlier, President Clinton was eager to associate himself
with the Kassebaum-Kennedy bill. Clinton prominently backed
the plan in his January 23 r , 1996 State of the Union
address, raising the bill's profile and placing pressure on
the Republicans to act. This pressure led Republican
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leaders in the House to piece together three earlier bills
into one measure, similar to the Senate bill. (Langdon,
1996, p. 2200)
It took seven months after committee approval for the
bill to reach the Senate floor. Once it arrived, it again
fell victim to presidential campaign politics and partisan
fighting, with an attempt to add a MSA amendment. The
resulting partisan bickering caused the bill to languish an
additional three months, before a compromise solution could
be reached. In the end, both parties compromised a little
to craft legislation acceptable to both ideological camps.
After the bruising budget impasse between Congress and the
President, reform legislation was considered a necessity for
those lawmakers seeking reelection in November 1996.
The new law, named principally for its chief sponsors,
largely incorporated health reform ideas on which both
parties had agreed since the Bush Administration. The
bill's main accomplishment restricted the ability of
insurance companies to deny coverage due to pre-existing
health problems. (Zaldivar, 1996, p. 5A)
Although it did not help the more than 4 million
uninsured Americans, it provided greater protection for
millions of workers. A GAO study estimated that "about 21
million people would be able to get coverage because of the
pre-existing conditions clause, and about four million
people could use the portability guarantee to change jobs




V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The collapse of the Clinton health care reform
initiative and the Republican electoral victory in 1994
ended the 60 year old debate over the feasibility of a
federally financed health care system for all Americans. The
Committee for Economic Security, which designed the Social
Security Act of 1935, had considered including national
health insurance in the legislative package. However,
national health insurance was omitted in the end for fear of
jeopardizing two more important and immediate goals - an
old-age retirement system and unemployment insurance. The
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 was widely viewed
as continuing the unfinished vision of national health
insurance. When President Clinton proposed the Health
Security Act in 1993, after 3 years without major action,
national health care again looked to be within the realm of
possibility. (Aaron, 1996, p. 35)
In the spring of 1993, all the elements seemed to be in
place for reforming health care. There was a growing
national consensus that something had to be done about
rising health care costs. Public opinion polls showed that
80 to 85 percent of Americans thought there was a health
care crisis, and that the system needed reconstructive
surgery. More important, there was a new President who had
successfully campaigned for health care reform, and wanted
to deliver on this promise. He was joined by Democratic
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congressional leaders, who had spent a long time waiting for
a Democratic President to exercise the possibilities of an
activist government. (Toner, 1995, p. 30)
There are many reasons for what turned the health care
reform drive of 1993 into the legislative train wreck of
1994. The President made a series of strategic
miscalculations. He pushed independently for an all or
nothing plan of universal coverage rather than crafting a
bipartisan policy. The Administration's mysterious health
care task force, chaired by First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton, met and devised the Health Security Act in closed
door session. They delivered a politically tone-deaf plan.
Time also proved to be a killer of health care. By
presenting the plan to Congress late in the legislative
session (October 1993) , the Administration left
congressional leaders less than a year to craft suitable
reform legislation. (Toner, 1995, pp. 31-33)
The President, a centrist Democrat, believed he could
bridge the tensions between the liberal and conservative
factions of the Democratic party. This centrist philosophy
may in part explain the complex health reform plan the
Administration advanced. The plan tried to appease both
factions; provide universal coverage to every American -
clearly a goal of the liberal side - while avoiding the
appearance of direct government involvement in financing and
running the new health care system - a major concern of the
conservative side. Because the plan had been crafted to
appease both Democratic factions, without relying on
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Republican support, it was immensely complex and confusing.
In this atmosphere, the Republican party could easily
convince the American people that the plan represented a
tremendous federal tax and spend policy, and a government
takeover of one-seventh the American economy. (Toner, 1995,
pp. 31-32)
The demise of health care reform in the 103 rd Congress
had less to do with the deficit implications of the various
bills than with the politics behind the reform process. Of
the eight bills considered and scored by CBO, six would have
decreased the cumulative deficit over a ten year period; two
bills, including the President's bill, would have increased
the cumulative deficit. Of these eight bills, only two were
debated and reported out of committee and one was briefly
debated by one of the full houses of Congress. The deficit
implications of these bills does not appear directly
responsible for their limited support. The deficit impact
had more of an indirect effect . In an effort to reduce the
deficit, most of the health reform bills included stiff
provisions for containing costs and increasing revenues.
These provisions, although reducing the deficit
implications, eroded support from congressional members who
viewed them as adversely affecting their constituents or the
status quo.
In 1994, the Republicans seized control of both
houses of Congress and immediately embarked on a journey to
balance the budget by the year 2002. Their goal was to
balance the budget, return a huge tax reduction to the
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American people, and not touch Social Security or defense.
With over half of what the federal government spends exempt
from cuts, attention shifted to savings from the two
government health care programs: Medicare and Medicaid.
These same two programs, according to CBO, were fueling
future growth in federal deficits. Rising at an annual rate
of about 10 percent, total Medicare and Medicaid outlays
were expected to double by 2005. This growth was
unsustainable in a budget predicated on reducing both the
government and the tax burden on the American people. At
this rate of growth, CBO estimated that Medicare and
Medicaid spending combined would nearly equal total
discretionary spending in ten years, or exceed it if
discretionary spending were not allowed to keep pace with
inflation. (CBO, Aug 1995, pp. 22-27)
In their quest to hold down the growth rate of
Medicare, the Republican budget replaced the open ended
guarantee of national coverage to a defined contribution
health care program. They believed that only by changing
Medicare to a defined contribution could Congress control
costs, and ultimately future deficits.
Among the many proposals to reduce the federal
government's share of Medicaid, the one gaining the most
momentum was capping Medicaid spending. By capping spending
at a rate substantially less than 10 percent growth and
turning the program into block grants for the states, the
government would effectively convert the program into a
defined contribution plan.
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The Democrats viewed the Republican agenda as a step
toward reversing the gains they had made on the road to
national health care. With little input into the budget
debate and priorities, the Democrats crafted a policy of
demagoguing the Republican's Medicare plan. Using the
media, they effectively put the Republicans on the defensive
with adds designed to convince elderly Americans that the
Republican policies would savage the program, removing the
health care safety net the elderly had "earned."
Late in the 1995 legislative session, Republicans and
Democrats worked together to craft a health insurance reform
bill incorporating provisions which had bipartisan support
during the 1994 health reform debates. The bill, sponsored
by Senators Kassebaum and Kennedy and 12 cosponsors, cut a
wide ideological swath in the Senate. For the first time
Democrats and Republicans were working in harmony to craft
an insurance reform bill that the American people considered
necessary. The bill sailed through the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee with complete bipartisan support.
However, the bill encountered turbulent weather once it
was exposed to the acrimonious atmosphere of the full
Senate. There the bill languished for over seven months,
caught in the political jockeying for the upcoming
presidential elections. The debate over Medical Savings
Accounts (MSAs) looked like it would derail this final
attempt at health care reform. The issue had strong
Republican support, but was considered to be a poison pill
to Democrats and the President. Compromise on the issue was
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paramount if the legislation was to ever reach a House-
Senate conference committee. With a single handshake
between a liberal senator and conservative House member, a
compromise was reached between the liberal wing of the
Democratic party and the conservative wing of the Republican
party. The Congress was positioned to achieve something
that had eluded it for years: health insurance reform.
The Kassebaum-Kennedy bill is significant. For the
first time in over four years Democrats and Republicans were
able to work together to craft a health reform bill. The
bill had a nominal impact on beneficiaries, providers and
the deficit. Thus, it was able to garner support from both
ideological camps (the liberal and conservative wings of
both parties) . The previous two attempts (the 1993-94
Clinton health care reform initiative and the 1995
Republican Medicare and Medicaid initiatives) had
substantial impacts on beneficiaries, providers and the
deficit, and could not attract the necessary support for
passage. The implication is that health care legislation
which portends minimal impact on beneficiaries, providers
and the deficit is much more likely to garner the support
necessary for compromise and passage; legislation which has
a much broader effect will not receive the same





Political interest in health care policy and financing
will remain a hot issue for at least three reasons. First,
public pressure to balance the budget will keep Medicare and
Medicaid in the public spotlight. These two programs
represented more than 22 percent of federal spending in 1996
(excluding interest on the debt) , and are projected to grow
to more than 27 percent of federal spending by the year
2002. (CBO, Aug 1995, p. 2) Additionally, the increase in
spending on Medicare and Medicaid, as a percentage of GDP,
accounts for all the projected increase in the federal
deficit between 1996 and 2002. (CBO, Aug 1995, p. 2)
Second, the retirement of the baby boom generation,
starting in 2010, portends large increases in federal
spending for Medicare and Medicaid.
Third, an inexhaustible flood of new medical
technologies and techniques will continue to put financial
pressure on everyone who pays for health insurance,
including state and federal governments. Real health care
spending has grown more than 5 percent annually over the
last four decades.
For these three reasons the issue of health care
financing will not go away. In the aftermath of the 1994
health care reform train wreck, and the 1995 Republican
balanced budget failure, the landscape of the health care
reform effort has changed. (Aaron, 1996, p. 35)
The American political system is very complex and
dynamic. In this type of system, transformational change is
87
extremely difficult if not impossible to manage without
overwhelming public support or crisis. The political system
favors a policy of incremental change. Change, although
achievable in a partisan atmosphere, is easier to effect in
a truly bipartisan atmosphere of debate and compromise.
Without bipartisan support, the minority will tend to
undermine the majority proposals through demagoguery and use
of the media.
The deficit will continue to shape and define any and
all future health care policy debates. Public opinion polls
lend credence to the Republican claim that the deficit must
be controlled and the budget balanced. Ultimately, big
changes in Medicare are unavoidable. Medicare covers 12.8
percent of the U.S. population; by 2030 it is expected to
cover nearly 20 percent of the population. No conceivable
improvement of system efficiency will support 20 percent of
the population on the same tax base which currently supports
12.8 percent of the population. (Starr, 1996, p. 27)
This is especially pertinent considering the change in
the demographics which make up this tax base. In 1995 there
were 144 million workers supporting 37 million Medicare
beneficiaries, translating to 3.9 workers per beneficiary.
By the year 2030, there will be only 2.2 workers per
beneficiary; by 2060 this ratio will drop to two workers per
beneficiary (see Figure 13) . (Langdon, 1997, p. 489)
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Figure 13. Workers per Beneficiary.
Source: 1996 Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Several important areas of health care reform remain to
be explored. First, there is the role of the federal
government in the demise of the uncompensated care
subsystem. Uncompensated care involves cross subsidies to
support the uninsured population. Compensation for this
segment of the population comes from insured patients who
pay more than the full cost of their care.
Second, future policy reform alternatives that could
slow the growth of Medicare and Medicaid should be analyzed.
These initiatives would have to consider possible changes in
private health insurance financing and the fears the elderly
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